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  Robert Frodeman
Abstract
The success of contemporary society in producing knowledge
serves to highlight the breakdown between knowledge
production and its use. New Orleans and Katrina offer one
example of this breakdown. All the knowledge necessary for
acting beforehand was available; the problem was not one of
knowledge but of will. Geoaesthetics, appropriating the erotic
nature of our relationship to the land, is offered as an interand transdisciplinary means for making disciplinary knowledge
more pertinent.
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1. Introduction
Assaying is a procedure where one measures a property of a
system or a system as a whole, such as the concentration of
gold in an ore body. It is time for an assay of knowledge-not
of this or that type of knowledge, but of knowledge itself, in
terms of its use, abuse, and disuse for life.
Despite - or better said, because of - the tremendous growth
in every sphere of learning, science, and technology, we suffer
from a massive incoherence in the current configuration of
knowledge. This gap stands out all the more as our learning
piles skyward. This failure has two dimensions:
1. horizontal: the lack of integration across the
academy and more generally among knowledge
producers; and
2. vertical: the lack of communication between
knowledge producers and knowledge users in
both the public and private sectors.
Both problems are rooted in the disciplinary nature of
knowledge production. For while knowledge is structured in
terms of disciplines, our problems are not. The societal
challenges we face will not turn on developing new knowledge
but rather in finding ways to make use of the knowledge we
already have. Geology and aesthetics can help alleviate this
situation.
'Geology' here does not mean traditional hard rock geology mapping, mining, or mineralogy - but rather something closer
to what has come to be called 'Earth system science' - the
new geology that studies the lithosphere, hydrosphere,
atmosphere, cryosphere, and biosphere as an integrated
whole. In fact, even beyond Earth system science lies an
integration that hearkens to the ancient roots of the term - a
logos of Gaia, an ordered account of all facets of our life on
Earth, natural and social. In this sense, a full-bodied
philosophy of geology is at the same time an environmental
ethics.

As Heidegger noted, science is our definition of the real. We
look to scientists, not artists, poets, philosophers, or
politicians, for statements about the true nature of things. But
ironically, the definition of science that dominates society what can be called the physics model of science - is itself
irreal. It is irreal because science depends on
parameterization, breaking off part of the world so that it can
be studied in isolation, repeated over and over again in an
experiment. Of course, in the real world nothing is really
isolated from anything else.
There is a deep connection between the disciplining of
knowledge and the dominance of the scientific method. Both
rely on the assumption that it is possible to study things in
isolation. One result of this powerful but fundamentally irreal
definition of truth has been the breakdown in the relation
between knowledge production and use. If you seek a ready
example of this, consider Iraq or New Orleans and Katrina.
We need a new philosophy of science, and of knowledge, that
puts priority on the connection between knowledge production
and its use, one based on geology and aesthetics rather than
physics and ethics. What would a philosophy of science and
knowledge that took its cue from geoaesthetics look like? It
would be based on field truths rather than the laboratory;
rooted in the policy concerns of decision-makers; and attentive
to the erotic dimension of life.
My thesis, then, is this: The artful combination of aesthetics
and geology, taking its cue from the epistemological truths of
field geology, and dedicated to cultivating our connection with
and love of the natural world, offers the promise of a better
marriage of knowledge and relevance.
In the space remaining I will move back and forth between
two points, offering some general thoughts on the state of the
current relation between science and society, while also
providing an example of what a geologically-oriented
philosophy of science might look like through a brief
consideration of New Orleans and Katrina.
2. Science and the Use of Knowledge
Despite the comments of President Bush, who claimed "I don't
think anyone anticipated the breach of the levees," the
dangers facing New Orleans were well publicized for decades
preceding the events of August and September 2005. For
example, in July 2004 the US Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) held a five-day exercise in Louisiana. Using a
hypothetical hurricane, the goal was to devise an integrated
regional response. Named "Hurricane Pam," the exercise
imagined 120-mph winds and rain that overtopped New
Orleans area levees, causing the evacuation of more than one
million residents and destroying a half million buildings. The
local New Orleans newspaper, The Times-Picayune followed up
with a multi-day series publicizing the effects of a "Hurricane
Pam."
But when Katrina hit 15 months later, both government and
citizens were woefully unprepared. How are we to explain this
breakdown in the use of relevant knowledge? In part, we must
acknowledge the importance of factors such as cronyism

reaching up to the top levels of the US Government, the
history of corruption in New Orleans, and the large number of
poor and disenfranchised within the city. But there were also
other, deeper, less accidental, more fundamental causes at
work.
In the 17th century, Western society invented a distinctive
way to address life's problems: through the discovery,
development, and application of technical and scientific
knowledge. That is, objective knowledge, value-free
knowledge. In previous times and cultures, people had placed
their trust in god, king, or nature and accepted the world more
or less as it presented itself. Beyond the merely practical,
knowledge consisted in identifying one's place in the natural
order and moderating one's desires in order to live a good life.
What the medievals called libido scientia-the endless desire to
know-was viewed with suspicion. Excessive knowledge was
thought to lead to folly and self-destruction. Greek tragedy
was based upon such themes.
In the modern view, however, knowledge is not a problem but
rather a solution, an unalloyed good, and even a panacea. As
Descartes says in his Rules for the Direction of the Mind, given
the scientific method, "there is no need for the mind to be
contained within any limits." Within the United States, this
attitude has become enshrined within long-term trends of both
the public and private funding of science. Over the last fifty
years, funding of science and technology has steadily grown
with every American administration, Democrat or Republican.
In 2005 in the United States, the amount spent on the public
funding for science reached $138 billion. Privately funded
research spent triple that amount.
This massive amount of funding for science over decadal time
spans now provides data for asking, "How much benefit has
come from this massive amount of scientific research?" The
question of the possible disparity between our production of
new knowledge and the lack of received benefit is now coming
to be recognized as a major challenge within knowledge
culture. In the United States, somewhat ironically, this
question has itself led to a new research program.
In 2007, the US National Science Foundation began a new
research program in "the science of science policy." The goal of
this program is to improve our understanding of how science
can have maximum impact on society.[1] The programis part
of a growing recognition that science cannot be judged solely
in terms of scientific criteria. This simple but revolutionary
point also led the NSF in 1997 to reorder its criteria for the
peer review of proposals, coming up with two: intellectual
merit and broader impact.
As one might expect, the research being funded under "the
science of science policy" is generally oriented along economic
lines. Rather than calling for the development of a general
theory of pertinent knowledge-or for that matter, the
development of an agnatology, a theory of ignorance-the NSF
has focused on the development of tools for measuring how
basic scientific research contributes to economic growth.
It is telling that the NSF calls the program the 'science' of
science policy rather than a 'philosophy' of science policy. The

modernist positivist patina remains, assuming that what
counts can be counted and that what can be counted counts.
Of course, knowledge production may indeed be good for
economic growth. But this speaks very little to fundamental
questions of politics and ecology; for instance, whether
scientific discoveries increase tensions between different
cultures, or whether further economic growth is ecologically
sustainable (see China).
Aestheticians in league with geologists have distinctive skills to
bring to the development of a full-bodied philosophy of science
policy. Together, they have skills and perspectives that can
help society explore the full range of how knowledge
production and use can be better connected. For both geology
and aesthetics are integrative fields that show the connections
between things.
3. Akrasia and the Breakdown in Knowledge Use
The connection between the production of knowledge and its
use by society takes any number of forms: by intention or
accident; personally or anonymously; or across small or great
spans of space or time. The disconnection between the
discovery of knowledge and its use can happen through the
simple failure to listen, improper handoffs between parties,
misinterpretations on one side or another, the intercession of
extraneous forces (that is, politics), or the rise of unanticipated
consequences.
For instance, rather than being measured in terms of
economics, the breakdown in the connection between the
production and use of knowledge may be characterized in
ethical and psychological terms. Chapter 7 of Aristotle's
Nicomachean Ethics consists of an extended reflection on
akrasia-incontinence, or failure of the will. Aristotle asks, how
is it possible for us to act in ways contrary to the conclusions
of our own reason? He divides incontinence into two types,
weakness (astheneia) and impetuosity (propeteia). The weak
person follows through the process of reasoning but then fails
to act on his or her own conclusion. Reason is overmatched by
a passion. In contrast, the impetuous person simply reacts,
not engaging in an act of reasoning until after the fact, if at all.
Society has devised different strategies to combat akrasia. For
instance, in the case of smoking, individual acts of akrasia
have societal consequences, so society has chosen measures
of soft paternalism, like laws banning smoking in restaurants.
Analyzing the case of New Orleans, however, raises
complications involving questions of scale (e.g., individuals
who didn't evacuate versus the actions of the mayor or
governor, or US Federal Agencies such as the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)) and timeline (e.g.,
the hourly timeline of evacuation decisions versus the decadal
timeline of levee decisions). There are also questions of the
lived experience of people that may underlie a failure of will when the consequences of individual decisions are far removed
from daily experience or when consequences result from the
aggregation of small decisions.
Akrasia can also be caused by our ontology, the intellectual
categories we use to describe experience. Consider the effect
of the terms 'facts' and 'values.' While discussed in terms of

facts, disputes about whether or how to rebuild New Orleans
have mostly turned on questions of differing values. After all,
we all know values - ethical, aesthetic, or other types - are
subjective.
Prototypically, (scientific) facts are supposed to inform, lead,
or even change our values. This is the idea underlying
programs such as the US Global Climate Research Program
(USGCRP, now CCSP, the Climate Change Science Program).
Politicians were to hold off on making decisions concerning
climate change until scientists discerned the set of facts
sufficient for justifying one or another type of action. This was
called science for policymaking. Of course, this is not how it
has worked out, in the climate-change debate or elsewhere. It
is vastly more common for the values themselves to be
assumed rather than argued for. Debates consist in
marshalling this or that disciplinary body of knowledge in
support of a predetermined set of values. Participants bring a
disciplinary perspective to the table and then use it to express
their values. Disagreements result more from inter- than from
intra-disciplinary discussion: disputes within a given
disciplinary frame are much less profound than those between
disciplinary frames. This is what we would expect, since
disciplines are defined largely in terms of a shared set of
values about how to best understand things. Nonetheless, the
assumption remains that we would all agree on what we
should do, if only we knew the (scientifically generated) facts.
The problem, however, lies in this talk of facts and values.
These two words evoke the entire architecture of modernity,
where science is thought to provide objective facts that inform
our subjective value preferences, which are then adjudicated
via democratic debate. This architecture is under strain today,
as scientific studies have shown that rather than being either
objective or subjective, science is an intricate blend of personal
and societal perspectives, robust reflection on the nature of
things, interpretive leaps, and an excess of objectivity
(Sarewitz, 2000). Better to say that, rather than objective or
subjective, science is inter-subjective, as are the social
sciences and the humanities.
In terms of their epistemological status, the main difference
between the sciences and the humanities is this: under the
physics model, science can circumscribe its reasoning so that
it can produce well-founded, reproducible, albeit irreal results.
But as noted above, the conditions of the laboratory are not
the conditions of the world. In the real world, conditions are
never able to be completely isolated from other effects, nor
can we ever truly repeat the same conditions. The 'objectivity'
of the laboratory sciences is a construct. That's why
philosopher Nancy Cartwright titled her 1983 book "How the
Laws of Physics Lie."
Once science enters the real world of the field its results are
beset by the same uncertainties that typify the field sciences
and the humanities. This is not to diminish the sciences, which
are chock full of well-grounded reasoning. It is rather to
highlight the fact that, rather than being a poor imitation of
what properly happens in the lab, field based sciences like
ecology, geology, and anthropology present us with a truer
picture of the nature, strengths, and limitations of scientific

reasoning.
4. Eros and the Pursuit of Knowledge
In Plato, the analogous terms for 'facts' and values' are 'logos'
and 'eros'. But what a difference the terms make! 'Logos',
richer than 'science' and even 'logic,' includes all the means by
which we total up our experience. Logos, for instance, includes
narrative and moral reasoning as well as science. As has been
noted by many (e.g., MacIntyre, 1984), scientific reasoning is
itself derivative from an encompassing narrative logic that
explains the origins, meaning, and purposes of the research.
But it is 'eros' that's the crucial term for us here because of its
dual connection to overcoming akrasia and to the exposition of
beauty. In the first instance, of course, eros means sexual
desire, but for the Greeks it also points to desire in general.
And, crucially, for Plato eros also includes an element of moral
and spiritual development.
For Freud and modernity, desire is polymorphously perverse. It
has no goal, inherent meaning, or direction, sexual or
otherwise. Attractions are subjective and arbitrary. There is,
for instance, no reason for us to be holding a meeting at Koli
rather than a windowless hotel in Helsinki. If we choose to
meet here, it's the expression of our subjective inclinations,
nothing more. In contrast, for Plato our desires could and
should be educated. So, for instance, questions of beauty are
interpretive but also real, grounded in our ability to give good
reasons for our opinions. They also have a natural end-the
appreciation of the good.
Put differently, for Plato eros is an inter- or transdisciplinary
force that unifies and directs the disparate threads of
knowledge. Education today is overwhelmingly technical in
nature; for Plato, education consisted primarily of an education
in eros. One learned the proper way to comport oneself in the
world through cultivating the right kind of desire and desire for
the right things. Instruction in music was the single most
important part of this self-cultivation, for music tuned and
attuned the soul.
Substituting 'eros' for 'value,' then, involves more than simply
pouring old wine into older bottles. The term 'value' is eros
trivialized, subjectified, rendered non-teleological, and stripped
of its inherent connections with reason. As a result,
disciplinary knowledge today provides order without
integration, orientation, or motivation. Integration and
orientation is supposed to come from one's values. But since
values are solipsistic-felt preferences, our only options are to
aggregate them and take the mean, or allow the majority to
decide through a vote on discrete choices. The result, often, is
intellectual cacophony, whether the question is protecting a
natural landscape, New Orleans, or something else. Motivation
is supposed to come from self-interest, but self-interest is too
frail a reed to sustain either individual decisions or social
policy.
For Plato, one can never separate the offering of a rational
account of experience from the erotic well-springs that lie at
the root of that account. Logos can not be logical unless it is
erotic as well. While Plato acknowledged that eros had a

disruptive, even mad element, it also unified the pursuit of
knowledge by directing us toward first and last questions,
achieving not unity or unanimity but rather a common focus on
fundamentals and ends.
Surprisingly, Aristotle did not see the potential for eros to help
us overcome the problem of akrasia. But the question of
motivation lies at the heart of the contemporary breakdown
between the production of knowledge and its effective use.
The question is, how do we awaken eros, the desire to act on
knowledge? That is, how do we motivate people to do what
they know they need to do-awakening not their just self
interest but rather their passion? This is where aesthetics
becomes crucial.
5. Heidegger and Geoaesthetics
Throughout his writings the philosopher Martin Heidegger
continually challenged our culture's definition of science as our
best access to reality. Heidegger argued that properly
understood, aesthetics gives us our best knowledge of reality,
for it is aesthetics that "makes the connection" between
things. The recognition of beauty is where we are won over,
our minds and souls captured by a person, place, or idea. True
knowledge is not the bare awareness of a fact; true knowledge
is an occurrence - it is the moment when we realize - that is,
make real - what was always there but not properly
appreciated until now. This is why Heidegger calls aesthetics
the shining of being - it is the place where reality really stands
out.
You can therefore see why a geo-aesthetics is potentially so
powerful. There are few tasks more important today than
changing our relationship to the Earth. And despite the work of
legions of ethicists, it is not going to be in the first instance
environmental ethics that is going to change people's minds.
After all, who comes to Koli or the Grand Canyon for ethical
reasons? Rather, the connection between our well-grounded
account of the world that science develops and action, the
erotic element, will come through aesthetics.
New Orleans presents us with a particularly intricate case of
the relation between logos and eros - that is to say, between
our accounts of the nature of things and getting people to act
on their knowledge. This is because of the combination of New
Orlean's exceptional geologic situation and its history as
America's most erotic city. This is not the place to explore this
curious and wonderful example, which was the subject of a
workshop I led in New Orleans in March of 2006, but to note,
in closing, that the very uncertainties of New Orleans'
geographical, hydrological, and meteorological situation
contribute to the erotic history of the city. Desire always plays
off of uncertainty and suspense; danger and the certainty of
eventual loss heighten our appreciation of the object of
contemplation.
Heidegger evokes the intricate relation between time, death,
and desire in the Preface toBeing and Time when he
announces his central theme: ". . . time as the possible
horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being." Our
experience of and hunger for reality are tied to our temporal
circumstances. After all, we do not ignore a child's injured

knee even though she will no longer be around in a hundred
years. Our feelings for a thing are always wrapped up with its
fragility; there is no need to care at all for things that are
indestructible.
Whether New Orleans or Koli, our appreciation of beauty is
tied to our awareness that the situation cannot last. But rather
than despair, our most human reaction is to exercise more
care.
Endnotes
This paper was first conceived as a plenary talk for a
conference in Koli, Finland, on The Aesthetics of Stone and
Rock. It has been slightly modified for publication here.
[1] Science Vol. 308, no. 5722, 617.
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